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Abstract 
 The article discusses legal-political controversies over the implementation of international 
human rights conventions in Norway, with special attention to claims concerning judicialization 
and power transfer effects. Insofar as a dynamic interpretation of state obligations by 
international supervision agencies is said to affect the balance of legislatures to courts, such 
claims create a platform for critique of governmental initiatives to implement human rights 
conventions. In a recent controvercy over the incorporation of CEDAW into the 1999 Human 
Rights Act, government lawyers have on this basis argued what I here call a doctrine of  
“appropriate restraint”. The article recapitulates the CEDAW controvercy, and critically 
evaluates the doctrine’s content in relation to its power transfer claims. On May 8th 2009, the 
Norwegian Government presented the bill on incorporation of CEDAW into the Human Rights 
Act. 
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A. Introduction 
This spring the Norwegian parliament – the Storting – will vote on a governmental proposal to 
incorporate CEDAW into the Human Rights Act. The Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women is the fifth international human rights convention to be 
incorporated into this law which explicitly states that in case of conflict between convention 
statutes and other Norwegian law, the former has priority. In popular terms, this is often referred 
to as the Human Rights Act’s “semi-constitutional” status.  
The 1999 Human Rights Act  incorporates the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and, since 2003, the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (CRC). The decision to incorporate CEDAW was made after a decade’s debate on 
the proper implementation of international human rights conventions in national law. Varying 
political majorities have been in favor of an extensive incorporation strategy. Groups of 
government lawyers, mainly concentrated around the Office of the Attorney-General and the 
legal section of the Ministry of Justice,1 have consistently fought to rally support for a strategy 
which I here choose to call a doctrine of “appropriate restraint”. Briefly summarized, this 
doctrine is about putting on the brakes. The Attorney-General2 holds the opinion that the proper 
line to prioritized incorporation should be drawn after the European Convention on Human 
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.3 His advice has not been 
followed. No other Nordic country has chosen similarly broad forms of implementation at such 
high levels of formality as Norway. By now, however, it seems that a final line has been drawn.  
In the proposal to incorporate CEDAW into the Human Rights Act, the Government also states 
that CEDAW would be the last international convention to enter this law.4   
Generally stated, the Human Rights Act is meant to secure a national legal practice that is 
consistent with international human rights practice.5 The Office of the Attorney-General is 
concerned about the consequences of the national human rights regime with regard to the 
traditional balance between courts and elected political assemblies. But misgivings such as those 
expressed by this office are not necessarily linked to the particular Norwegian context of 
prioritized incorporation. They resonate through the critical discourse on international human 
rights which in more general terms depicts an opposition between court-based human rights 
protection and democratic majoritarian rule.6  
The oppositional frame is built trough the advocacy of a thesis on judicialization and 
concurrent/consequent inappropriate power shifts, or transfers. In the human rights context, the 
thesis then questions the legitimacy of international control over state power and sovereignty 
through implementation of human rights conventions, and problematizes, in general terms, the 
possible shifts in legislative power which might be brought about through the dynamic 
interpretation of state obligations by international supervision agencies, i.e., human rights 
committees and courts.  
While the formal legal implementation of human rights obligations in itself is seen as 
representing a form of judicialization, the dynamic interpretation style of international human 
rights bodies is claimed to further skew the balance between international and national powers, 
in largely unforseen/unpredictable ways. Internationally driven judicialization is also seen to 
skew the balance between the national courts and the national legislature if/when national courts 
apply these interpretations in ways that transcend a traditionally restrained role vis-à-vis the 
legislature.  
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From this combined “judicialization and power transfer” thesis follows the need for caution in 
implementing human rights and, thus, the doctrine of “appropriate restraint”. Giving the floor to 
the Norwegian Attorney-General, only those statutes which are “suitable for enforcement by 
courts” (“egnet for å håndheves av domstolene”, my translation) should be incorporated into 
Norwegian law. Statutes must be sufficiently “clear” to be applied by courts, and sufficiently 
“broad” in balancing different considerations. In the eyes of the Attorney-General, some human 
rights are seen as more basic (“grunnleggende”) than others, and only the former warrant 
(prioritized) incorporation.7 
The present thematic issue on judicial review in the Nordic countries departs from a general 
observation about a traditional common pattern of hesitant, or restrained, application of judicial 
review. It is thus important to note that  “appropriate restraint” in the human rights context, while 
cautioning against expansive autonomous interpretation of human rights obligations by the 
national courts, seems mainly opposed to expansive international influence on national 
legislation through various indirect forms of review, which then address the state’s adherence to 
human rights obligations by way of national court interpretation. This way, concerns about 
sovereignty seem to form the dominant “power transfer” issue here. Jonas Christoffersen has 
outlined how a more general human rights critical discourse may follow one of two optional 
axes, a vertical axis which positions the “national” vs. the “international”, and a horizontal axis 
which poses the “political” vs. the “judicial”.8 In the Norwegian context the two themes are 
intertwined, but still seem most strongly expressed along the vertical axis.  
How international human rights influence national political decision making also became 
important issues in two parallel, large scale research investigations of “power and democracy”, 
commissioned by, respectively, the Norwegian Government and Danish parliament towards the 
new millennium (1998−2003). Controversy divided the research group in charge of the 
Norwegian study over judicialization claims and assessment of the human rights regime and 
resulted in a majority and dissenting minority report. 9 In the Danish context, no similar 
disagreement over human rights regimes arose.10 As member of the Norwegian commission I 
wrote a minority report in opposition to the majority’s critique of human rights implementation 
which it claimed had contributed to undermine popular democratic rule through processes of 
judicialization. Since the Norwegian Power and Democracy Commission delivered its final 
report in 2003, I have participated in the public debate on the incorporation of CEDAW into the 
Human Rights Act, and in hearings initiated by parliament and parliamentary party groups on 
this issue. Here, I have objected to the manner in which the Power and Democracy report has 
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been strategically used by parts of the legal establishment as evidence of large scale power 
transfers which in turn support the reasonability of the doctrine on restraint. Nor do I, generally 
speaking, share the viewpoint that we should accept a different legal status for those human 
rights conventions which provide special protection to groups and individuals who are 
particularly vulnerable to discrimination, out of consideration for theoretically assumed, or 
generally stated, institutional power shifts. In writing this article I thus recapitulate the recent 
controversy over the national human rights regime from a position as an active participant.  
 
B. The incorporation debate 
Firstly, let me state some rather obvious premises. It is the states’ sovereign right to choose to 
enter into international agreements. The human rights regime thus deals with self-imposed 
limitations to sovereignty. From the perspective of a state that has ratified a convention, the 
question is therefore how best to ensure compliance at the national level. When human rights 
obligations create controversy, it is partly due to how rights and obligations are formulated, and 
how they are interpreted dynamically. Put simply: When ratifying a convention, the state cannot 
know in detail what it endorses. The extent of the legal protection of human rights is developed 
through the practices of the international agencies which monitor the states’ compliance with the 
conventions.11 
 
It is the responsibility of the state to secure compliance with ratified international human rights 
conventions. But in the Nordic countries the so-called dual principle also regulates the concrete 
legal obligations. “Dual” means that international and national law are considered as constituting 
two discrete spheres, and that implementation decisions in the parliaments are necessary in order 
for the conventions to be applied in national law. Implementation of conventions in national law 
can be undertaken in many ways. One way is “incorporation”, which means, simply stated, that 
the convention’s text is included as law.12 As already noted, this has become the preferred 
strategy in Norway, where the 1999 Human Rights Act  incorporates four human rights 
conventions with priority granted the incorporated conventions in cases of conflict with other 
Norwegian law.  
 
The recent history – and increasing controversy − of active human rights implementation can be 
held to date back to a governmental decision in 1989. A governmental committee appointed to 
prepare for national implementation recommended “incorporation” as the most “suitable” form 13 
and proposed incorporation of what it termed the “main conventions” (hovedkonvensjoner),  
ECHR, ICCPR and ICESCR. Incorporation was seen as the most “loyal” form of implementation 
with the strongest “signal effect” –internally in Norway and with regard to other states and 
international organizations.14 When Parliament adopted the Human Rights Act, two UN 
conventions were added to the list of candidates for incorporation, CRC and CEDAW. In a green 
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paper presenting the Government’s new Action Plan on Human Rights in 2000 15, the 
Government reported that preparations to incorporate the two UN conventions were under way, 
and that it was considering the Convention Against Torture and the International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) as appropriate candidates for 
incorporation. The definition of “main conventions” was here explicitly expanded to include all 
of “the six most central UN conventions”/ “the most central global human rights conventions”. 16  
CRC was incorporated into the Human Rights Act in august 2003. But August 2003 also marked 
a turning point with regard to political consensus on these reforms. This same month, the Power 
and Democracy Commission made its main conclusions public. The majority was highly critical 
of the national implementation of human rights conventions, which, it said, had accelerated the 
judicialization of politics. 17 “Judicialization” augments the power of the courts at the expense of 
political majority rule. In the human rights context, the power of the courts simultaneously 
moves from national to international legal institutions, thus restricting national autonomy and 
self-determination. More generally, “judicialization” was depicted as a process whereby an 
increasing number of areas are regulated through law, and political decision making is handed 
over to courts and other legal institutions. Interest struggles were portrayed as increasingly 
pursued as legal struggles by groups and individuals. Courts and other judicial bodies increase 
their decision-making powers at the expense of politics and public administration, wiping out the 
separation of legislation and legal implementation. The “fundamental meaning” of democracy is 
majority based decision-making in elected bodies, whereas rights based claims and politics only 
provide forms of “supplementary democracy”, the majority report stated.18  
My own dissenting statement rejected this “fundamental-supplementary” split. Generally, the 
minority report argued that rights build democracy. The rights based regulation of the 
relationship between state and individuals, and between majority and minorities, can be viewed 
as fundamental democratic premises.19 That people are effectively guaranteed fundamental rights 
is a prerequisite for their free and equal participation in popular democratic processes, and does 
not, as such, contribute to the disintegration of democracy.20 The minority report both described 
and criticized political priorities which, in the balancing of competing interests, force “a duty to 
yield” upon gender equality rights. It described CEDAW as an important point of reference for a 
global women’s rights movement and numerous networks of local groups and organizations 
engaging in practical on-the- ground human rights work. In terms of political mobilization 
against discrimination, it claimed that CEDAW presents a radical mechanism for change, both as 
a normative statement and as a concrete tool in democratization and development processes.  
However, with direct reference to the majority’s “judicialization” warnings, the Norwegian 
centrist-right coalition Government decided, spring 2004, not to carry through the planned 
incorporation of CEDAW in the Human Rights Act, choosing instead to give both CEDAW and 
ICERD a less privileged status, incorporating them in respectively the Gender Equality Act and 
the new law prohibiting discrimination on grounds of ethnicity, national origin, language and 
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religion (The Discrimination Act of 2005). 21 To completely disregard international conventions 
which in particular protect against discrimination of women and ethnic minorities, would 
undoubtedly place a heavy political burden on the Government. The Government also needed to 
take into account Parliament’s expressed wish to have CEDAW incorporated in Norwegian law. 
The new position on human rights implementation was thus shaped by these incorporation 
proposals, the Government here announcing a broader discussion in a follow-up green paper on 
the Power and Democracy Commission’s report.  
 
The judicialization claims in this report prompted a lively public debate in which the hierarchical 
framing of “fundamental” vs “supplementary” meanings, or forms, of democracy was an 
important point of reference.22 The report was distributed for consultation by the Office of the 
Prime Minister,23 before the green paper on Power and Democracy 24 was discussed by 
Parliament in June 2005. The green paper’s approach to judicialization was twofold. First, with a 
focus on national legislation on welfare rights and corresponding discussions about the 
relationship between the state and municipal levels, and second – and most comprehensive – 
with a focus on “specific challenges in relation to international agreements”, the Government set 
out the general consequences of the EEA (EØS) agreement, which, it said, encouraged 
judicialization in terms of both expansion and concretization of legal standards. “Viewed with 
Norwegian eyes” regulations following from the EEA agreement might seem unnecessarily 
detailed and difficult to grasp.25 However, the costs of this kind of judicialization are balanced 
by the economic advantages of cooperation.26 The human rights arena poses a set of different 
challenges. Here it is particularly important to find the proper balance between the national 
legislature, national courts and the international supervision system.  
 
Based on this declaration, the green paper presented what I regard as the adoption of a slightly 
modified doctrine on “appropriate restraint”. The modified version does not reject incorporation 
of new conventions in Norwegian law as such. The modified doctrine mainly distinguishes 
between prioritized and non-prioritized incorporation. This of course was necessary to recognize 
as “appropriate” the strategy which already had been applied with regard to the incorporation of 
CEDAW and ICERD.  The Government’s principal view was stated as follows: The priority 
clause should be reserved for “special instances” (“spesielle tilfeller”). With regard to 
incorporation, the principal rule should be that the incorporated convention is given the rank of 
ordinary law, where the general, national, interpretation principles apply. In this way, the 
Government states, it wishes to increase predictability and clarity in the legal system and thereby 
                                                 
21 While the ban on torture was implemented through a new § 117 a in the Penal Code in 2004. 
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konklusjoner om rettsliggjøring av politikken og demokratiets forvitring (Oslo, Universitetsforlaget 2005), and 
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 Makt og rett (Kinander (red) 2005), cf. also Sand 2005, Andenæs, Sand and Hellum (2005).  
23 See: http://odin.dep.no/smk/norsk/regjeringen/001001-990268/dok-bn.html 
24 St. meld. 17 (2004-2005). See note 7 
25 St.meld. 17, pkt. 3.7.4.3. 
26 St. meld. 17, pkt. 3.8. 
avoid an unfortunate development along the lines of transfer of power from legislative to 
judiciary authority.27  
But the green paper referred neither to CEDAW nor ICERD, even though it discussed both 
“Gender and power” and “A diverse, multicultural population” quite extensively. By this very 
emission, the Government once more – if implicitly − made it clear that these conventions were  
regarded as “unsuitable” for incorporation into the Human Rights Act simply due to general 
considerations about the risk of institutional shifts of power. 
 
But as incorporation of CEDAW and ICERD in the Gender Equality Act and the Discrimination 
Act provided no priority clause, the issue remained controversial. When the general election in 
September 2005 resulted in a change of Government, the new centrist-left coalition pledged to 
reverse the decision and work to incorporate CEDAW in the Human Rights Act. ICERD was 
now, however, left behind. It still took all of three years for the new Government to draft a 
proposal for this incorporation. Needless to say, government lawyers fought to maintain the 
earlier break through for restraint. The Attorney General arranged seminars for the Cabinet on 
the consequences of expansive human rights regimes, and provided special guiding for cabinet 
members appointed after the seminars. Here the government lawyers claimed the benefit of a 
particular insight into the workings of the international supervision bodies. 28 The civil servants’ 
seeming reluctance to proceed in accordance with the Government’s aims was publicly 
contested. Others, including feminist organizations, national and international aid organizations, 
human right agencies, and academics continued to put pressure on the Government. 29 
In November 2008, a consultation paper on incorporation of CEDAW into the Human Rights 
Act was finally presented by the Ministry of Justice. Notably, the consultation paper repeated at 
length the general political forebodings toward judicialization and power shifts. It then moved on 
to substantive assessments and discussed concrete legal consequences – i.e. the immediate, or 
probable, consequences of the priority clause to existing legislation, and presents a series of legal 
regulations where a priority clause might have effect. The evaluations however consistently 
concluded that there is little reason to assume that conflict arise. In the following consultation 
process only one invited party opposed the Government’s plan. Not surprisingly, it was the 
Office of the Attorney-General, who stated the office’s general reservations to prioritized 
incorporation of international conventions which pursue only “special values and interests”, and 
repeated its “often expressed worry” about the strategy of prioritized incorporation. It did not 
consider the actual evaluations made by the Ministry of Justice on incorporation consequences. 
Instead the office enclosed the 2004 consultation letter to the Prime Minister’s Office on the 
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(“utsiktspunkter”) from which to gauge the collective effect of international and national rule production, and the 
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29 From The Norwegian Centre for Human Rights, see for instance Njål Høstmælingen: “Annenrangs 
menneskerettigheter for kvinner og etniske minoriteter?” (commentary) Morgenbladet, 15. April 2005, Geir 
Ulfstein: “Internasjonale menneskerettigheter: Er det gått for langt?” Lov og rett nr. 5-6 2005, .257-258; from the 
Department for Women’s Law at the Institute of Public Law, see for instance Anne Hellum: “Maktutredningens 
påstander om rettsliggjøring settes ut i livet – en knekk for demokratiet?” Editorial in Hefte for kritisk juss. 30, 2, 
2004, Anne Hellum: “Konvensjonell sexisme” (commentary) Dagbladet 31.03.2009. 
 
Power and Democracy investigation. 30 In the incorporation proposal, the Government made its 
priorities clear. Incorporation of central human rights conventions strengthens the rights of 
individuals vis-à-vis the state, and offers effective protection against infringement. This 
protection is a basic principle in a law governed state and democracy. The Attorney-General’s 
arguments were important, but with regard to CEDAW other considerations counted more. A 
prioritized incorporation would increase awareness of gender equality and women’s rights 
nationally, and send a strong signal to the international community. However, while CEDAW  
“holds a very central place among the human rights conventions”, no new political moves would 
be made to incorporate others. Other conventions are of  “a more special character”, the 
Government simply concluded.  31  
 
C. Where does the proper demarcation line lie? 
The doctrine of “appropriate restraint” rests on the premise that it is not only possible, but also 
quite reasonable to have different forms of implementation for different human rights 
protections. Yet all efforts to draw distinctions which establish a system of more or less “basic”, 
more or less “central” human rights conventions, lend themselves to protests about inherent 
value preferences, and consequent value hierarchies. The chosen strategy of incorporation of full 
convention texts represents (as intended) a highly visible form of implementation. But this very 
visibility also contributes to the construction of built-in winners and losers − winners are the 
incorporated conventions, losers are the non incorporated. The same logic applies to the priority 
clause. Arguments can of course be made that non-incorporated conventions are important 
“enough” and binding when ratified. But the problem of yielding duties imposed on some 
conventions is inherent in this recipe for differential treatment, as is the pressure toward equal 
treatment. 
Restrained incorporation does not imply a questioning of judicial review as such. It does not, for 
instance, raise loud concerns about the democratic foundations, or accountability, of courts as 
such, when they engage in judicial review of legislation. 32 If we stick to the 2005 green paper on 
the Power and Democracy Report, “judicialization”  primarily problematizes the scope enabled 
by extensive incorporation of international conventions in terms of “possibilities”. The green 
paper acknowledges that international review foremost is a review of the national courts’ 
interpretation of human right obligations.33 At the same time it cautions against national “over-
implementation”, referring to the Supreme Court’s guidelines on interpretation of ECHR from 
2000. 34 But it accepts the premise of the priority clause: In cases of conflict ordinary legislation 
                                                 
30 Letter to the Ministry of Justice, 02.02.2009 
(http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/JD/Høringsuttalelser/LOV/Kvinnediskrimineringskonvensjonen/Regjeringsadvo
katen.pdf) (accessed 23.03.2009). 
31 Ot.prp. nr. 93 (2008-2009), 22. 
32See Richard Bellamy:”The Democratic Constitution: Why Europeans should avoid American style Constitutional 
Review” (2008) 7 European Political Science, 9-20. This is broadly discussed by Andreas Føllesdal (2009), see note 
6. See also Marlene Wind: “When Parliament Comes First – The Danish Concept of Democracy Meets the 
European Union” 27 Norodic Journal of Human Rights ( this issue). 
33 St.mld 17, pkt. 3.7.4. See note 12. 
34 Rt. 2000/996, on double penalties, see Inger-Johanne Sand (2009), note 5. For further debate see for instance 
Carsten Smith: ”Om Høyesteretts forhold til den europeiske menneskerettighetskonvensjon” (2005) 23 Nordisk 
tidsskrift for menneskerettigheter, 433-440, Inge Lorange Backer: ”Om Høyesteretts forhold til den europeiske 
menneskerettighetskonvensjon” (2005) 23 Nordisk tidsskrift for menneskerettigheter, 425-432.  
yields to statutes in “special instances” conventions as these are developed by international 
courts and commitees. This is “as practice has been in Norway”.35 
 In terms of legal hierarchies, the full implications of this reference to “special instances” are still 
somewhat difficult to grasp. We understand that in the eyes of the government there are 
conventions which do not merit incorporation into the Human Rights Act. But exactly why this is 
so for which conventions, we do not know. While the former government applied the term 
“special instances” to mark conventions which merit incorporation, the present government, on 
the other hand, applies the term “special character” to mark conventions which do not merit 
incorporation. But neither clarify why “special” would signal on the one hand inclusion, on the 
other hand exclusion.  
Both the legal section of the Ministry of Justice and the Attorney-General’s Office have 
responded to consultation papers on incorporation acts over the past decade. In a 2003 
consultation over incorporation of CEDAW, both agencies were preoccupied with the 
relationship between judicialization and political room to maneuver. The relevance of this should 
of course be evaluated on the basis of CEDAW statutes. CEDAW protects women’s equal right 
to personal freedom, to life and health, to self-determination, co-determination and participation 
in society. It aims to change all cultural, social, economic and legal structures which rely on the 
notion that women are less worth than men, protects women’s equal right to education, paid 
work and health care and equal rights to participation in political and public life. The convention 
requires states to include the principle of equality between women and men in national 
constitutions or other appropriate legislation, to prohibit all discrimination against women and 
refrain from and prevent every action or practice that discriminates against women – as stated in 
article 2 of the convention − “to take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against 
women by any person, organization or enterprise”.  
The Attorney-General’s arguments against incorporation of CEDAW  might be summarized as 
follows, 36 
- An argument about judiciability: CEDAW contains too many unclear and vague 
requirements, and statements that are not law-like enough.  
- An argument about judicialization: Incorporation of CEDAW will thus grant power to the 
courts to decide what convention rights imply. 
- An argument about consequent power transfers: This might change the balance between 
legislator and court, and increase the influence of courts at the expense of parliament. 
These arguments are not, however, made only with regard to CEDAW.  Similar arguments were 
made at the public hearing on incorporation of ICERD, and repeated at a public hearing on the 
incorporation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. It seems that a generalized approach 
is applied where every convention that comes up for public and political consideration has to 
contend with the same critique: it is too vague, too open, and likely to shift the balance of 
institutional power by judicializing politics.  
To illustrate the problem of  this generalized approach we can compare convention assessments 
by the Norwegian Attorney-General and the Danish governmental Incorporation Committee in 
the late 1990s. Danish law incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights (but without 
a comparable priority clause) and the mandate of the committee was to assess whether UN 
                                                 
35 St. meld. 17, pkt. 3.8. 
36 Ot.prp.35 (2004-2005), Om lov om endringer i likestillingsloven mv(Gjennomføring av Europaparlaments- og 
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kvinner med tilleggsprotokoll i norsk lov) 76-77. 
human rights conventions could be similarly incorporated. A unanimous committee 
recommended the incorporation of ICCPR, ICERD, and of the convention on torture.37 With 
regard to CEDAW, many of the positive obligations for the member states were deemed too 
broad, “relatively vague and generally formulated” for incorporation. 38 On the other hand, the 
Norwegian Attorney-General has dismissed ICERD on largely the same grounds as he dismisses 
CEDAW 39. Comparing these differing evaluations we are left in the dark as to who made the 
more “correct” legal assessment. Both seem guided by broad, if different, policy preferences. 
Somewhat ironically, incorporation controvercy thus produces its own sub theme of 
“judicialization”, i.e. when legal advice actually is general policy advice. 
 
D. Some final remarks 
Over the past decade, the Norwegian parliament has adopted a comparatively strong national 
human rights regime. Parliament has generally been in favor of a comprehensive incorporation of 
international conventions. It has also been clear about its ambitions for full implementation, 
compatibility and consistence between international practice and Norwegian law.40 In light of 
this parliamentary priority, it would of course be rather imprecise simply to claim that the 
adopted human rights regime undermines majority based political decision making. The power 
transfer claim might be specified as one of unintended consequences. But as such, it has not been 
substantiated in any systematic way in the documents examined here, or across convention 
obligations. We are still left with no answers to these important questions: Exactly how do 
different international human rights agencies influence national political decision making in 
unwanted and/or unacceptable ways? Does (different kinds of) international supervision harm 
the national legislative prerogatives? If so, how is this influence to be evaluated as an issue of 
balancing the state’s interests and the individuals’ rights in various circumstances?  
As a general claim, “power transfer” seems to be mainly anxiety driven − that is, related to 
thinkable, possible, or probable, unfortunate effects. The actual implementation of the ECHR 
clearly leaves an imprint on national politics. But it is not primarily the ECHR which incites the 
calls for restraint. In this sense, references to “power transfers” are also somewhat inconsistent. 
Furthermore, as a succession of public hearings on the incorporation of human rights 
conventions in Norwegian law have shown, opposition to (the expansion of) this regime has 
primarily been rooted and maintained within parts of the public administration. In my view the 
recent incorporation controversy over CEDAW mainly demonstrates how the resistances of 
centrally placed and powerful civil servants have managed to curb the political will of 
governments. Civil society actors have mainly been in favor of a comprehensive and radical 
human rights regime.  
 
The two Power and Democracy studies carried out from 1998 to 2003, differed in their 
assessment of a range of issues. Overall, the Danes were consistently more upbeat about the 
general “state of democracy” than the Norwegians.41 I think that in order to understand the 
                                                 
37Koch et al. 2004: 44-46. See note 12. This has not been taken up by the Danish government, Vedsted-Hansen 
2004: 47, see note 6. 
38 Betænkning nr. 1407, oktober 2001, Justitsministeriet. 
39 Ot.prp.no. 33 (2004-2005), 62. See note 14. 
40 Cf. Sand 2009. See note 5. 
41 Lise Togeby: ”Hvorfor den store forskel?” (2005) 46 Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning, 55-60 and Øyvind 
Østerud: ”Norsk og dansk demokrati” (2005) 46 Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning, 61-62. 
differences between the principal conclusions drawn by the two commissions, it is important to 
note that the Danish commission made no attempt to build a hierarchical distinction between 
“fundamental” and “supplementary” forms of democracy, as was the case in the Norwegian 
majority report. Instead, the Danish Power and Democracy commission directly tied their 
understanding of “democracy” to notions of citizenship. Citizenship had a “Marshallian” rights’ 
perspective, comprising not only the classic civil and political rights like freedom of speech, 
freedom of association and the right to vote, but also includes social rights or the right to live a 
dignified life in accordance with society’s general standards. 42 Clearly, I am myself much in 
sympathy with this way of placing democracy in perspective.  
 
Although the recent incorporation bill on CEDAW programmatically states that incorporation of 
central human rights conventions strengthen the rights of individuals vis-à-vis the state by 
granting effective protection against infringement, it seems quite clear that CEDAW will be the 
last convention to be enjoy the prioritized arrangement provided by the Human Rights Act. In 
line with several earlier governmental assessments, the incorporation bill is clearly concerned 
with the likely effect of internationally driven “judicialization”. As I read these expressed 
concerns, they imply a broader political breakthrough for the idea of applying as much restraint 
as (still) possible.  
 
Those who fear the power transfer implications of the national human rights regime ought of 
course to engage in a debate about the main implementation strategy per se − that is, the 
prioritized incorporation of international human rights conventions. Far more attention should in 
this respect also be directed at those court decisions which have the clearest impact in Norway − 
namely, the ECrtHR’s. But such specific targeting is probably too politically complicated to be 
very likely. In this sense, the particular controversy over the status of CEDAW in Norwegian law 
could perhaps also be read as debate by proxy.  
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